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Abstract 
 
In the last years banks and firms relationship in Italy has experienced deep changes 
due to a new revised national and international regulation and to an increasing 
globalization of economic environment.  
These evolutions imply a new bank-firm relationship with a deeper disclosure, in a 
perspective of partnership between them.  
In this scenario, “Basel 1 and 2 accords” have been contributing to revise bank-firm 
relationship, moreover in the specific perspective of small-medium sized firms. 
In Italy, the evolution of bank-firm relation has been also influenced by an intensive 
banking system restructuring process, characterized by big mergers and small local banks 
aggregations. 
This paper focuses on bank-firm relation impact on small-medium sized firms 
financial reporting quality. 
The analysis empirically examines some proxies for earnings quality for a sample of 
Italian small-medium sized firms over 10 years period. Earnings quality metrics are based 
on the relation between working capital accruals and cash flows, following Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) approach. 
Across these metrics we will perform a cross-sectional analysis on the relation 
between earnings quality and some variables regarding banks and firms governance, 
controlling for regulation changes and other variables such as size, sector etc.  
The paper will also investigate the relation between earnings quality and cost of debt. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The on going processes of deregulation and liberalization of financial markets, have 
caused a series of competitive dynamics that have oriented financial intermediaries 
towards economic efficiency and dimensional growth finalized to guarantee an adequate 
competitiveness either in the domestic contest, or in the international one.  
These factors and the difficulties of smaller banks to benefit of scale economies and 
competitive mass explain the intense process of consolidation we can observe in Europe 
and in Italy.  
The index of Italian banks system concentration remains, however, lower than in the 
other countries of the Euro Area (except for Germany) (Assoneb: Semestral Report on 
Bank). 
In a framework of increasing competition, both large and small banks have been 
forced to undertake a deep restructuring process. The main results of the reorganization 
of the credit system have been a significant concentration process, similarly to that 
occurred in other European banking systems: the enhanced competition led by 
deregulation has forced Italian banks to look for a bigger size in order to achieve 
economies of scale and scope, as well as a better managerial capability, thus improving 
their overall efficiency. As a consequence, a reduction of the number of banks occurred 
during the last decade. 
Competition and concentration require an increasing capability to acquire, manage 
and use information about the borrowers. 
 
2. The Italian scenario 
 
Traditionally, Italian firms have raised capital through the typical continental banking 
systems or through retained earnings rather than recurring to the securities markets. 
The Italian bank-oriented system is characterized by a diffuse presence of SMEs, with 
no or limited access to financial market and lack in financial competences, and small-
medium banks, firmly rooted in the local markets. 
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The high number of big-sized family firms is also one of the most known typical 
features of Italian capitalism, in which publicly held companies are quite absent, most 
companies are closely held, the financial markets are not really effective and 
entrepreneurial families play a decisive role in the economic system performance. 
So that, Italian corporate governance system is characterized by controlling 
shareholders with a strong leadership, consisting of few people (very often the founding 
families), with a high concentration of ownership. In this contest, financial information 
can more easily loose its role of primary and neutral information channel to the bank. 
Bank-firm relation is quite informal and depends on personal relationship between the 
controlling shareholders and the banks. 
These conditions and their implications are of great significance, particularly in order 
to develop of an efficient financial market. 
In this sense, “Basel 1 and 2 accords” have been contributing to revise bank-firm 
relationship in order to favor a better disclosure and a balanced relationship between bank 
and firms, moreover in the specific perspective of small-medium sized ones.  
Furthermore, according to Northcott (2004) relationship lending contributes greatly to 
economic growth by promoting the efficient allocation of capital as long as better 
informed banks provide credit to the most productive projects first. 
 
3. Bank-firm relation. Literature overview 
 
The extensive literature on bank – firm relation can be analyzed from different points 
of view: corporate governance theory, transaction and agency costs, risk management, 
value creation, information asymmetry (Diamond 1984) and competitive advantage 
(Porter, 1985). 
From a corporate governance perspective, banks provide an indirect source of interest 
alignment by mitigating the risk-taking tendency of managers and thus improving the 
quality of the projects undertaken by the firm (Diamond, 1984, James, 1987, Lummer 
and McConnel, 1989, Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996, Boot and Thakor, 2000). 
In addition to that, it’s possible to study bank-firm dealings from a relational point of 
view. In this sense, the so called “relationship lending” (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger 
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and Undell, 1995) is traditionally opposed to “transactional lending theory” (Thunman, 
1992, Boot and Thakor, 2000; Cesarini, 2003). In the first one, there is a strong, stable 
and long-term credit relationship between bank and firm; instead, in the second case, 
relations are discontinuous and characterized by a short-term perspective. 
Lending relationships are favored by the possibility to have better and privileged 
information exchanges that cause benefits both to the borrower and to the lender: i.e. 
lower monitoring costs and the possibility to achieve a competitive advantage in 
comparison to other competitors banks. 
Theoretical studies and empirical findings agree that relationship lending increases 
capital availability to firms (Keltner, 1995; Petersen, 1999; D’Auria et al. 1999; Ferri and 
Messori, 2000). On the contrary, there is not a common agreement in the literature about 
the effects of relationship lending on the cost of credit.  
Some empirical studies (Keltner 1995; Elsans and Krahnen, 1998 and Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994; Berger and Undell, 1995; Keltner, 1995) provide evidence that a close 
lending relationship with a bank will allow the borrower to pay a lower interest rate, thus 
enhancing the value of the relationship; others suggest that relationship lending exposes 
the borrower to a monopolistic rent, with higher loan interest rates (D’Auria et al., 1999; 
Degryse and Van Cayseely, 2000; Forestieri and Tirri, 2002). 
Other studies highlight further costs and risks of lending relationship . 
First of all, a single and stable relationship with only one bank can involve the so 
called “hold-up costs” linked to the information monopoly the bank generates in the 
course of lending (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). Secondly, this type of relationship can 
generate switching costs, related to the expensive process (in term of time and money) 
necessary for the substitution of the main bank.  
Another cost connected to lending relationship is the so called “soft budget 
constraint”, which has to do with the potential lack of toughness on the bank’s part in 
enforcing credit contracts that may come with relationship-banking proximity (Boot, 
2000). 
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4. Bank concentration and information 
 
Concentration in the banking industry may have important implications related to the 
efficiency of financial sector, bank stability, credit policy, industrial competitiveness.  
In our analysis, bank-firm relationship is critical for its impact on the information 
flows between the bank and the firm..      
In many countries, as in Italy, banks are the most important providers of financial 
resources for small and medium firms. A wave of bank mergers during the past decade 
has decreased the total number of banks and has increased banking sector concentration. 
According to BCE data1, between 1995 and 2004 the number of financial intermediates is 
fallen down from 9.500 to 6.400. 
Someone argues that concentration will intensify market power and thereby stimulate 
competition and efficiency. Others argue that economies of scale drive bank mergers and 
acquisitions, so that increase efficiency and stability contributing in creating incentives 
for banks to avoid imprudent risk-taking.  
Thus, bank mergers can lead to efficiency gains that are potentially passed on to 
borrowers. Lower loan rates imply that borrowers are more likely to continue borrowing 
and to increase their loan volumes from the consolidated bank. On the other hand, 
mergers also often increase market power, which may result in borrowers decreasing 
their loan volumes or in termination of relationships, overall for SMEs (Stein, 2000 and 
Strahan and Weston, 1998). 
While excessive competition may create an unstable banking environment, 
insufficient competition in the banking sector may breed inefficiencies.  
Table 1 and table 2 show the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (IHH) - obtained by 
squaring the market-share of the various players, and then summing those squares - for 
financial intermediaries market in five main European countries (Italy, France, Germany, 
United Kingdom and Spain), calculated on the total intermediated funds.  
                                                 
1
 BCE, “Consolidation and Diversification in the Euro Area Banking Sector”, Monthly Bullettin, may 2006 
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
ITALY 201 210 220 190 260 270 240 230
FRANCE 229 485 509 587 606 551 597 623
GERMANY 114 133 140 151 158 163 173 178
UK 208 221 250 264 282 307 347 376
SPAIN 285 329 441 581 551 529 521 482
Unicredit Research on BCE data
Table 1
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It immediately appears a clear trend in all European countries toward an high 
financial intermediaries market concentration. 
This phenomenon is, obviously, influenced by different contingent, social and 
political aspects.  
The enhanced competition led by deregulation, as in the Italian case, has forced banks 
to look for a bigger size in order to achieve economies of scale and scope, as well as a 
better managerial capability, thus improving their overall efficiency through a complex 
reorganization process. 
In table 3 (Source: Banca d’Italia, annual report) we can observe the trend of mergers 
and acquisition in Italian banking sector for the period 1993-2002. 
 
 
Table 3 
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As a consequence of this trend, a strong reduction in the number of banks has 
occurred during the last decade. The above two mentioned tendencies (competition and 
concentration) stress the need for banks to become more market oriented and client-
driven for competing in the new environment.  
In this perspective the development of close, long-lasting relationships with selected 
target of customers, especially with regard to corporate segment, assumes the form of a 
strategic choice in order to gain comparative advantages.  
In order to achieve this result, it is fundamental to create, sustain and develop a 
continuous exchanges of data and information: the intensity and the quality of bank-firms 
relationship, in other words, have to be inspirited by an co-operational approach. 
Cooperation presupposes a relationship of trust between the bank, its external auditor 
and firms. If there is no trust, co-operation cannot exist.  
But trust is founded on information sharing. Higher levels of information disclosure 
and data integrity are necessary, due to regulations such as Basel 1 and 2 accords, that 
represent an instruments to build transparency in bank-firms relations and to assure the 
market about the fairness of players. 
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On the one hand, in a even more competitive market, banks will have to assure better 
services and solutions, always increasing quality and creating a straightness relationship, 
involving also the development of combined strategies.  
On the other hand, the enterprises that will be able to distinguish themselves in term 
of stability, transparency and information compliance will also be able to obtain smaller 
financial rates and a more complete service.  
Moreover, a continuous analytical and operating control, like in the rating procedures  
will offer to the enterprises a constant monitoring of their risks assuring directly the 
banks and indirectly the whole market.  
 
5. Bank concentration and the effect on credit availability 
 
After a M&A operation, the relationship between firms and bank (target or bidder) 
obviously tends to change. It is discussed if this concentration process affects or not the 
availability of credit, in terms of rate, volume or conditions. 
First of all, it’s possible to distinguish merger operations from acquisition operations. 
Usually, in fact, in the case of a merger, the consequences on the firm/bank relationship 
are more complicated, due to a new reorganizational process that lead to a loss of soft 
information. In the other case, instead, normally, acquisition is a synonymous of 
preservation of existing relationship (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi G., 2003).   
Regarding to the effect on credit availability in a post M&A situation, the literature’s 
position  is not unique. 
Sapienza (2002) demonstrates that consolidation has a negative effect on credit 
relationship, particularly in relation to small business. She finds that interest rates on 
credit lines decrease in the case of bank mergers. 
Berger and Undell (1998) maintain that after an M&A deal, banks tend to reduce their 
portfolio share of small business, due to the impact of information losses. 
Degryse H., Van Cayseele P. (2000), also demonstrate that borrowers of target banks 
continuing the relationship after the M&A are harmed, and have a 1.1% lower change in 
loan volume (as a percentage of assets) than otherwise similar firms borrowing from non 
merging banks. 
 10
On an other position, Bonaccorsi and Gobbi (2003) demonstrates, in one empirical 
study about Italian firms, that the bank consolidation has no negative effect on 
outstanding credit. 
 
6. Earnings Quality. Literature review 
 
In recent years earnings quality (EQ) and the quality of financial reporting have 
becoming more and more important. This big attention is the consequence of the financial 
scandals of the early 2000s even if the concerns regarding earnings quality exist since 
long before. This subject is complex and literature doesn’t present a unique definition of 
earnings quality. 
According to Balsam e.a. (2003), there exist various measures of earnings quality in 
literature but those different measures capture various manifestations of earning quality.  
Investors are very interested in companies earnings. Bernstein (1993) says that 
earnings quality “arose out of a need to provide a basis of comparison among the 
earnings of different entities as well as from the need to recognize such differences in 
“quality” for valuation purpose”. 
Earnings are a summary measure of the performance of a firm (Dechow, 1994). 
Investors use EQ “as a conditioning variable to extract valuation-relevant information 
from earnings patterns” (Francis 2003). 
But the term EQ can have different meaning because it is a broad concept. 
The accounting literature embraces several definitions. Some of them focus on the 
persistence of earnings in the sense that current earnings can be considered a good 
indicator of future earnings. Some others consider the relation between accruals and cash 
flows.  
Hodge (2003) defines earning quality as the degree to which reported net income 
differs from future earnings. Chan e.a. (2004) consider EQ as the degree to which 
reported earnings reflect operating fundamentals. Mikhail e.a. (2003) define EQ as the 
degree to which a firm’s past earnings are associated with future cash flows. For 
Richardson e.a. (2001) it is the degree to which earnings performance persists into the 
next period. 
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But what are “high quality” earnings? According to Kirschenheiter and Melumad 
(2004) high quality earnings are earnings that are more informative and closer to the long 
run value of the firm. Revsine e.a. (1999) consider that earnings are of higher quality 
when they are sustainable. 
A possible explanation for the multiplicity of those different interpretations could be 
that different readers use the information to make different decisions (Kirschenheiter and 
Melumad, 2004). 
 
6.1 Different measures of Earnings Quality 
The main difficulty to treat earnings quality is the large number of measures that have 
been  used in literature. 
There is not a generally accepted approach to measure EQ. Recently, accounting 
accruals have gained attention as an important indicator related to earnings quality.  
Schipper and Vincent (2003) discussed the several classes of earnings quality 
constructs that have been used in literature. They classified them according to four 
categories. 
The first category refers to the concept of persistence, variability and predictability. 
The second one is derived from the relation among cash, accruals and income. 
The third one relates to qualitative concepts in the FASB’s “conceptual framework”. 
In the framework, quality is assessed in terms of relevance, reliability and 
comparability/consistency.  
Those three concepts cannot be separately measured.  
Finally, the fourth category is derived from implementation decisions. 
According to Bernstein (1993) there are three broad classes of factors that include 
EQ. The first class relates to management accounting and attesting accountants in their 
choice of the different accounting principles. 
The second one is connected with the degree to which “adequate provision has been 
made for the maintenance and enhancement of present and future earning power”.  
The last one refers to economic forces impacting on earnings on their stability and 
variability. 
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Williams considers at least three components of earnings quality, in particular, the 
persistency, the sustainability of earnings and earnings management. The concept of 
sustainability refers to the fact that earnings obtained through recurring activities have a 
better quality of those obtained through nonrecurring activities. 
To summarize, earnings quality is a broad concept encompassing many determinants. 
 The purpose of our paper is to analyse the trend of earnings quality during the 
observed period characterized by an intense bank concentration process, and the variables 
influencing it. 
In order to get a parameter of EQ we have used the model of Dechow and Dichev 
(2006). 
 
7. Earnings Quality in SME’s financial reporting and the evolution of bank-firm 
relationship. The methodology of analysis. 
 
The purpose of our analysis is to study the trend of financial reporting quality in 
Italian SME during the years 1997-2005 and its relation with bank-firm relation 
evolution. 
The sample consists of 300 firms for 10 different sectors, with sales ranging from 5 to 
50 millions of Euros2. The source of data is AIDA database. 
The analysis has been performed through the following steps. 
First, we confirmed the validity of Dechow-Dichev (2006) regression model of 
Earnings Quality for our sample.  
Then, we calculated their EQ parameters, and particularly of the standard deviation of 
the residuals of the regression model. This gives a representation of the evolution of the 
EQ in the period of the analysis. 
Then, the EQ data set has been put in relation, either on a quantitative or on a 
qualitative basis, with the independent variables influencing EQ. 
These variables have been individuated in the following: 
- debt/equity ratio; 
                                                 
2
 The sectors are: wood, shoes, chemical, buildings, metal, textil, automotive, food, turism, professional 
services. 
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- earnings/sales ratio; 
- income tax ratio; 
- bank concentration index. 
A linear regression analysis has been used to find out the relation between debt/equity 
ratio, earning/turnover ratio, income tax ratio (as independent variables representing 
causal variables of EQ) and EQ (as dependent variable).  
At last, the EQ parameter (standard deviation of the residuals of Dechow-Dichev 
model) and the residuals of the regression on EQ causal variables have been put in 
relation, on a qualitative basis, with a bank concentration index in Italy to argue the effect 
of bank concentration on EQ. 
As showed before, for a long time Italian Bank sector has been characterized by a 
lower concentration in comparison to other capitalistic developed economic systems 
(with the only exception of Germany), but in the period of analysis (1997-2005) Italian 
banking system has experienced an intense process of concentration. 
In fact, the Italian system is characterized by a great number of small local banks and 
a relatively few number of bigger banks, which are no more than medium sized in 
comparison to biggest global players. 
In last years Italian banking system has observed a process of some big mergers, 
which have increased the competitive power of the biggest Italian banks, and of many 
mergers and acquisition of small and medium sized banks either between them or by big 
banks. 
The lending procedures of small local banks is strongly based on soft and direct 
information about the borrower. Opaque financial reporting is then often tolerated and it 
hasn’t a negative effect on credit availability. 
Instead, the increasing Bank concentration has involved a more extensive utilization 
of rigorous and rationale lending procedures by big banks. Apart from the above 
mentioned discussion on the effects on credit availability, this should bring to a greater 
attention to firms’ fundamentals and to its financial reporting. 
The effect on earnings quality could be of a double nature, depending on the capacity 
of the banks in detecting earnings management policy aimed at improving credit merit. If 
the banks are assumed to be able to detect bad earnings quality there will be an incentive 
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for the firm to improve the quality of financial reporting. On the opposite side, there 
could be an incentive for the firm to manipulate earnings and to implement window-
dressing policy to improve credit merit. Of course, this second incentive will prevail if 
the bank is assumed to be unable to detect bad earnings quality. 
The qualitative analysis of correlation between bank concentration and earnings 
quality (for the part not explained by the other analyzed variables) will give a first answer 
to this problem, highlighting which of the above incentives is prevailing.  
 
8. Empirical results. 
 
8.1 The relevance of Dechow-Dichev (2006) model and EQ measurement. 
According to Dechow-Dichev model, we performed the following linear regression 
model for each year of the analyzed period (1997-2005): 
 WCt = 1 + 2 CFOt-1 + 3 CFOt + 4 CFOt+1 + t 
The relevance of the model is confirmed by the data of our sample.  
The R² of the model, representing the model significance, is quite high for every year 
of the analyzed period, ranging from 0,66 to 0,89. 
It is then verified that working capital changes in year t are negatively correlated with 
cash flows from operations in year t, and positively correlated with cash flows from 
operations in years t-1 and t+1. 
In the following table are illustrated the results of the regression model: 
 
 
 
 
Dechow-Dichev indicate as EQ measurement parameter the residuals of the 
regression analysis or the standard deviation of the residuals. 
Here are the results of EQ measurement in terms of total, mean and standard 
deviation of the residuals: 
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total Errors -6,669,515.34 -9,242,110.37 -7,921,032.25 -12,371,517.47 60,878,236.56 -10,578,071.72 -12,928,724.36
Average Errors -22,231.72 -30,807.03 -26,403.44 -41,238.39 202,927.46 -35,260.24 -43,095.75
standard deviation 1,212,725.74 1,681,787.76 1,573,075.22 1,940,582.37 2,357,845.59 1,815,677.58 2,175,879.84
 
 
Obviously, according to  Dechow-Dichev model, the higher the standard deviation 
the lower is the EQ.  
As showed by the following chart, representing the trend of standard deviation, EQ 
has a declining trend in the analyzed period, with a light adjustment in last two years. 
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This means that window dressing policies have tendentially increased in the same 
period. 
Regarding as the analysis of the relevance of Dechow-Dichev model, we can make 
two further observations. 
The opaqueness of SME’s financial reporting is not only due to overestimate and 
underestimate of working capital, but also to overestimate/underestimate of fixed assets, 
especially for the capitalization of intangible investments, such as R&D and marketing 
costs3.  
                                                 
3
 Under Italian GAAP, differently from IFRS, it is possible to capitalize marketing costs related to the 
launch of a new product or a new business. 
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For this reason, we have calculated the changes in intangibles assets to analyze their 
correlation with Dechow-Dichev EQ measure. Indeed, the firms of the analyzed sample 
doesn’t extensively recur to intangibles assets capitalization as earnings manipulation 
practice. Capitalization is not correlated to Dechow-Dichev EQ measure and it is also not 
correlated with the earnings before fixed assets capitalizations.  
Moreover, the model of analysis doesn’t capture the so-called “submerged economy”, 
which in Italy is not negligible. In other words, a part of the sales turnover could not be 
represented in the financial reports and this could be a way to manipulate earnings. For 
this reason there could be a bias in the analyzed data. Anyway, as in the case of 
“submerged economy” accrual sales and cash flows are misrepresented for the same 
amount, it could be deducted that it doesn’t alter the correlation between changes in 
working capital and cash flows from operations. 
Finally, we have also qualitatively measured EQ through the analysis of the 
frequency distribution of net earnings, to find out the trend of the mean value of earnings 
and the presence of significant frequency changes corresponding to specific thresholds 
(such as the zero net earnings). 
The mean value of earnings/sales changes as follow, in the considered period: 
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The chart shows an increasing trend of the ratio until 2000; after this year the 
earning/sales ratio decreases and it gets even negative in 2005. 
 
The following graphs show the frequency distribution of earnings/sales in 1997 and in 
2002. 
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Earnings/sales 2002
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In both chart it is possible to verify that a high percentage of earnings is concentrated 
around zero.    
In conclusion, the EQ measurement process shows a decreasing level of earnings 
quality in Italian SMEs in the period 1997-2005. The following paragraph will go 
through the causes of this phenomenon. 
 
8.2 EQ, indebtness, net profitability and firm taxation: a regression analysis. 
To understand the role of the variables on which the decrease of earnings quality 
could be dependent, we have performed a regression analysis with the following model: 
 
EQt = 1 + 2 (D/E)t + 3 (NE/S)t + 4 (T/EBT)t + t 
 
where: 
EQ is the standard deviation of the residuals in the Dechow-Dichev model; 
D/E is debt/equity ratio; 
NE/S is the Net Earnings/Sales ratio; 
T/EBT is the Taxes/Earnings before taxes ratio. 
 19
The regression analysis has been performed on the whole data set, with observations 
for each company and for each year. 
The R² of the regression model is not very high, having a value of 0,12 
The results of the analysis are the following: 
 
 Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Taxation/E, 
D/E, 
NE/sales(a) 
. Enter 
a  All requested variables entered. 
b  Dependent Variable: ERRORS 
 
 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,298(a) ,012 ,010 1773871,046 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Taxation/Earnings, D/E, Earnings/sales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EQ appears then to be: 
- positively correlated with indebtness (D/E ratio); 
- positively correlated with profitability (NE/S ratio); 
- negatively correlated with firms taxation level. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
137634,8 41196,161 3,341 ,001
-6560,400 4538,207 -,030 -1,446 ,148
-7785889 548152,6 -,297 -14,204 ,000
719,085 1226,705 ,012 ,586 ,558
(Constant)
D/E
Earn/sales
Tax/Earning
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: ERRORSa. 
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The results of the regression seem to be intuitive considering the effect of all the 
controlling variables. In fact, more indebtness and more profitability increase EQ, instead 
more taxes decrease EQ. 
The D/E ratio and the NE/S ratio effects can be explained with the lower incentives to 
misrepresent earnings suffered by the firm when its results are satisfactory and also with 
the higher incentives caused by the pressure of the lenders. 
The correlation of EQ with debt/equity ratio and with net earnings/sales ratio is 
statistically significant. In fact the negative correlation with the indebtness is represented 
by the estimated coefficient on D/E having a t-statistic of –1,45 and the correlation with 
the profitability is represented by the estimated coefficient on earnings/sales having a t-
statistic of –14,20. 
Instead, the correlation of EQ with Taxation/earning ratio is not statistically 
significant.  
 
8.3 Bank concentration and EQ. 
 
In order to analyze the determinant of earnings quality we have put in relation, on a 
qualitative basis, EQ with bank concentration index. 
The expected relation is not certain because a higher concentration could have a 
positive influence on EQ, due to the higher attention big banks direct on financial 
information, or a negative influence, due to the incentive to manipulate earnings as a 
response to the request of good financial performance. This relation must also consider 
all the other variables influencing EQ (whose relation with EQ is discussed above). 
In the following charts it is possible to identify the trend of Italian bank system 
concentration over the period 1997-2004 (according Herfindhal index) and the SME’s 
EQ trend over the period 1998-2004. 
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Bank concentration shows an increasing trend even if there is a small reduction in 
2003 and 2004.  
Also EQ trend shows a progressively increase during the years of banks concentration 
(with an exception in 2003). 
The changes in the D-D EQ parameter appear to be highly correlated with the 
changes in bank concentration. Furthermore, the changes in EQ are not fully explained by 
the changes in net earnings/sales and debt/equity ratios, which have an irregular trend in 
the observed period (and which are significantly correlated independent variables of EQ).  
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This means that the changes in EQ could be explained by the bank concentration 
process. This would mean that bank concentration had lead to worse EQ for SME. 
The above phenomenon could be explained by the opportunistic behavior of SME 
that, in presence of higher attention on financial results by banks and in absence of 
effective control systems on their financial reporting, increase the use of earnings 
manipulation practices. 
 
9. Conclusions and further implementations 
 
 In this sense, it is possible to say on a qualitative basis that, other variables (D/E, 
NE/S and taxation) unchanged, worse EQ is related to banks concentration.   
Furthermore, the main limitations and further implementations of the analysis are: 
- the implementation of other variables influencing earnings quality in order to 
implement the regression model; 
- a deeper analysis of the conceptual model and the use of more sophisticated and 
effective statistical tools; 
- a more detailed definition of the parameters of bank concentration; 
- the extension of the analysis to other countries. 
These aspects could be the main direction of further implementations of our work. 
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